DOCTORAL SUMMER SCHOOL

CENTRE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE at LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL

Thursday 10th July – Sunday 13th July 2008

 

 

Welcome to the 2008 Doctoral Summer School on Corporate Governance. (Admissions are now closed but another Summer School will take place in 2009.) You will find directions as well as information about the faculty and course content. See you all in London in July!

 

Lodging (only if pre-agreed):

·       Rooms have been booked in your names at the London School of Economics’ College Hall (directions).

·       Reminder: No need to pay unless your stay exceeds the three nights the Summer School is providing for free.

 

Food:

·       Morning (8.15-8.55): Quick coffee and biscuits at London Business School, Sainsbury Building, First floor lounge.

·       Lunch will be provided.

·       Participants must make their own dinner plans.

 

Lectures:

·       Where? London Business School (directions).

·       Lecture Theatre 9 (LT9) in the Sainsbury Building (campus map).

 

Faculty:

·       Julian Franks (JF)

·       Denis Gromb (DG)

·       Paolo Volpin (PV)

 

 

To get an idea of what we will cover, you can check some of the papers listed below ((S) are surveys). We will most likely cover less material than in the surveys and more than in the individual papers.

 

General surveys on Corporate Governance

·       (S) Shleifer-Vishny (1997) “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” JF.

·       (S) Tirole (2001) “Corporate Governance,” Econometrica.

 

 

Thursday 10th July

1.15-2.00: Registration/Coffee + Biscuits

·       London Business School, Sainsbury Building, First floor lounge.

 

2:00-3.30: Equity Ownership and Shareholder Activism: Theory (DG)

·       Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi (1997) “Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm,” QJE. 

 

3.30-4.00: Coffee

 

4:00-5.30: Equity Ownership: Empirics (PV)

·       (S) Holderness (2003) “A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control,” EPR.

·       Demsetz-Lehn (1985) “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,” JPE.

·       Morck-Shleifer-Vishny (1988) “Management Ownership and Market Valuation,” JFE.

 

 

Friday 11th July

 

8.15-9.00: Coffee + Biscuits

 

9:00-10.30: Shareholder Activism: Empirics (JF)

·       (S) Karpoff (2001) “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies,” WP.

·       Brav-Jiang-Partnoy-Thomas (2006) “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,” WP.

·       Carleton-Nelson-Weisbach (1998) “The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations,” JF.

·       Klein-Zur (2006) “Hedge Fund Activism,” WP.

 

10.30-11.00: Coffee

 

11:00-12.30: Takeovers and One-Share One-Vote: Theory (DG)

·       (S) Burkart-Panunzi (2006) “Takeovers,” WP.

·       (S) Burkart-Lee (2007) “The One Share - One Vote Debate: A Theoretical Perspective,” WP.

·       Grossman-Hart (1980) “Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corp.,” BJE.

·       Grossman-Hart (1988) “One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control,” JFE.

 

12.30-2.00: Lunch

 

2.00-3.30: Takeovers: Empirics (JF)

·       (S) Andrade-Mitchell-Stafford (2001) “New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers,” JEP.

·       (S) Holmstrom-Kaplan (2001) “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States,” JEP.

·       Bertrand-Mullainathan (2003) “Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences,” JPE.

·       Franks-Mayer (1996) “Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial Failure,” JFE.

 

3.30-4.00: Coffee

 

4.00-5.30: One Share – One Vote: Empirics (JF)

·       (S) Adams-Ferreira (2007) “One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence,” WP.

·       Nenova (2003) “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis,” JFE.

·       Smart-Zutter (2003) “Control as a Motivation for Underpricing: A Comparison of Dual and Single-Class IPOs,” JFE.

 

 

Saturday 12th July

 

8.15-9.00: Coffee + Biscuits

 

9:00-10.30: CEO Compensation and the Role of the Stock Market: Theory (DG)

·       Holmström-Tirole (1993) “Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring,” JPE.

·       Stein (1989) “Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Behavior,” QJE.

 

10.30-11.00: Coffee

 

11:00-12.30: The Role of Labour and Product Markets: Theory (DG)

·       Scharfstein-Stein (1990) “Herd Behavior and Investment,” AER.

·       Schmidt (1997) “Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition,” RES.

 

12.30-2.00: Lunch

 

2.00-3.30: CEO Compensation: Empirics (PV)

·       (S) Murphy (1999) “Executive Compensation,” Handbook of Labor Economics.

·       Bebchuk-Fried (2005) “Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues,” JACF.

·       Bebchuk-Fried (2003) “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” JEP.

·       Gabaix-Landier (2007) “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,” QJE.

 

3.30-4.00: Coffee

 

4.00-5.30: Board of Directors: Empirics (PV)

·       (S) Hermalin-Weisbach (2003) “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution,” NY Fed.

·       Adams (2003) “What do Boards do? Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data,” WP.

·       Hermalin-Weisbach (1998) “Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,” AER.

·       Yermack (1996) “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors,” JFE.

 

  

Sunday 13th July

 

8.15-9.00: Coffee + Biscuits

 

9:00-10.30: Law and Finance: Empirics (JF)

·       (S) LLSV (2000) “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” JFE.

·       Djankov-McLiesh-Shleifer (2007) “Private Credit in 129 Countries,” JFE.

·       Djankov-LLS (2008) “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing,” JFE.

 

10.30-11.00: Coffee

 

11:00-12.30: The Political Economy of Governance: Theory and Empirics (PV)

·       (S) Pagano-Volpin (2001), “The Political Economy of Finance”, Oxford REP.

·       Rajan-Zingales (2003) “The Great Reversals,” JFE.

·       Pagano-Volpin (2005) “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,” AER.