DOCTORAL SUMMER SCHOOL
CENTRE FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE at
Friday 31st
August – Sunday 2nd September 2007
Welcome
to the 2007 Doctoral Summer School on Corporate Governance. (Admissions are now
closed but another Summer School will take place in 2008.) You will find
directions as well as information about the faculty and course content. See you
all in
Lodging:
·
Rooms have been booked in your name in two
locations: John Dodgson House (directions
+ map)
and
·
Reminder: No need to pay at either location
unless you are staying longer than the three nights the Summer School is
providing for free.
·
Be careful: Some of you will need
to change location after one or two nights. Click
here to check where you are staying when.
Food:
·
Morning (8.15-8.55): Quick coffee and biscuits at
London Business School, Sainsbury Building, First floor lounge.
·
Lunch will be provided.
·
Participants must make their own dinner plans.
Lectures:
·
Where?
·
Lecture Theatre 9 (LT9) in the
Faculty:
To
get an idea of what we will cover, you can check some of the papers listed
below ((S) are surveys). We will most likely cover less material than in the
surveys and more than in the individual papers.
General surveys on
Corporate Governance
·
(S) Shleifer-Vishny (1997) “A Survey of Corporate
Governance,” JF.
·
(S) Tirole (2001)
“Corporate
Governance,” Econometrica.
Friday
31st August
8.15-9.00: Registration/Coffee + Biscuits
·
9:00-10.30: Equity Ownership and Shareholder
Activism: Theory (DG)
·
Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi (1997) “Large Shareholders, Monitoring
and the Value of the Firm,” QJE.
10.30-11.00: Coffee
11:00-12.30: Takeovers and One-Share One-Vote:
Theory (DG)
·
(S) Burkart-Panunzi (2006) “Takeovers,” WP.
·
(S) Burkart-Lee (2007) “The One Share - One Vote Debate: A
Theoretical Perspective,”
WP.
·
Grossman-Hart (1980) “Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem
and the Theory of the Corp.,” BJE.
·
Grossman-Hart (1988) “One Share One Vote and the Market for
Corporate Control,” JFE.
12.30-2.00: Lunch
2.00-3.30: Equity Ownership: Empirics (PV)
·
(S) Holderness (2003) “A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate
Control,” EPR.
·
Demsetz-Lehn (1985) “The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences,” JPE.
·
Morck-Shleifer-Vishny (1988) “Management Ownership and Market
Valuation,” JFE.
3.30-4.00: Coffee
4.00-5.30: Takeovers: Empirics (JF)
·
(S) Andrade-Mitchell-Stafford (2001) “New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers,” JEP.
·
(S) Holmstrom-Kaplan (2001) “Corporate Governance and Merger
Activity in the United States,” JEP.
·
Bertrand-Mullainathan (2003) “Enjoying the Quiet Life?
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences,” JPE.
·
Franks-Mayer (1996) “Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of
Managerial Failure,” JFE.
Saturday 1st
September
8.15-9.00: Coffee + Biscuits
9:00-10.30: CEO Compensation and the Role of the
Stock Market: Theory (DG)
·
Holmström-Tirole (1993) “Market Liquidity and Performance
Monitoring,” JPE.
·
Stein (1989) “Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms:
A Model of Myopic Behavior,” QJE.
10.30-11.00: Coffee
11:00-12.30: The Role of Labour and Product Markets:
Theory (DG)
·
Scharfstein-Stein (1990) “Herd Behavior and Investment,”
AER.
·
Schmidt (1997) “Managerial Incentives and Product Market
Competition,” RES.
12.30-2.00: Lunch
2.00-3.30:
CEO Compensation: Empirics (VA)
·
(S) Murphy (1999) “Executive Compensation,” Handbook
of Labor Economics.
·
Bebchuk-Fried (2005) “Pay Without Performance: Overview of
the Issues,” JACF.
·
Bebchuk-Fried (2003) “Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem,” JEP.
·
Gabaix-Landier (2007) “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,”
QJE.
3.30-4.00: Coffee
4.00-5.30: Board of Directors: Empirics (VA)
·
(S) Hermalin-Weisbach (2003) “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously
Determined Institution,” NY Fed.
·
·
Hermalin-Weisbach (1998) “Endogenously Chosen Boards of
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,” AER.
·
Yermack (1996) “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a
Small Board of Directors,” JFE.
Sunday 2nd
September
8.15-9.00: Coffee + Biscuits
9:00-10.30: Shareholder Activism: Empirics (JF)
·
(S) Karpoff (2001) “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target
Companies,” WP.
·
Brav-Jiang-Partnoy-Thomas (2006) “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance,” WP.
·
Carleton-Nelson-Weisbach (1998) “The Influence of Institutions
on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations,” JF.
·
Klein-Zur (2006) “Hedge Fund Activism,” WP.
10.30-11.00: Coffee
11:00-12.30: One Share – One Vote:
Empirics (JF)
·
(S) Adams-Ferreira (2007) “One Share, One Vote: The Empirical
Evidence,” WP.
·
Nenova (2003) “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and
Control: A Cross-Country Analysis,” JFE.
·
Smart-Zutter (2003) “Control as a Motivation for Underpricing:
A Comparison of Dual and Single-Class IPOs,” JFE.
12.30-2.00: Lunch
2.00-3.30: Law and Finance: Empirics (PV)
·
(S) LLSV (2000) “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,”
JFE.
·
Djankov-McLiesh-Shleifer (2007) “Private Credit in 129
Countries,” JFE.
·
Djankov-LLS (2008) “The Law and Economics of
Self-Dealing,” JFE.
3.30-4.00: Coffee
4.00-5.30: The Political Economy of Governance:
Theory and Empirics (PV)
·
(S) Pagano-Volpin (2001), “The Political Economy of Finance”,
Oxford REP.
·
Rajan-Zingales (2003) “The Great Reversals,” JFE.
·
Pagano-Volpin (2005) “The Political Economy of Corporate
Governance,” AER.